Although companies that sell products such as automobiles can easily track down their clients, companies that produce consumer goods usually lose direct contact with their customers at the retailer's cash register. This anonymity results in the obligation to communicate any product failure and/or recall action to a wide range of anonymous and potential customers, while running the risk of scaring off future buyers. Hypothesizing that companies know how to best communicate a recall, we investigate a sample of 104 German recall campaigns to identify common dimensions of recall messages and behavioral drivers that may minimize the risk of alienating future customers and reduce potential sales losses due to the product crisis. We identify six major underlying dimensions of recall messages and find empirical evidence for existing recall routines of companies depending on the degree of hazard and the probability of a product defect.
Introduction
Given the ever-increasing competitive pressure for innovation as well as continued improvement and development (e.g., Trommsdorff/Steinhoff 2007) , companies are forced to introduce new products into the market in evershorter innovation cycles. This acceleration has led to an increased risk of introducing new products that have not been sufficiently engineered, which may involve increased risk for the consumer. This is supported by the observation that the number of recalls of defective products has increased significantly since the mid-nineties (Beamish/Bapuji 2008) . With the German Appliances and Product Safety Law (Geräte-und Produktsicherheitsgesetz, GPSG) , that came into effect in 2004, and the implementation of the European guideline 2001/95/ EG with respect to product safety, we find an increased necessity for producers and retailers to recall dangerous or damaging products as soon as possible, as well as to identify and eliminate sold units (GPSG 2004 in combination with Felcher 2003 and Kersten 1992 . The same is the case for American producers and retailers as recall rates in the US market steadily raise. According to Beamish/Bapuji (2008) , toy recalls alone significantly increased from 17 in 2004 to 22 in 2007 in the US. This boost resulted in 22 toy-related deaths and an estimated 220,500 toy-related injuries in 2006. The US Consumer Protection and Safety Commission (CPSC) estimates that the yearly overall costs due to recalls and product failures in the US today are approaching 357 billion US Dollars (CPSC, 2007) . companies' image. In addition, companies are interested in the context factors influencing the decision to start a recall.
The extant literature focuses primarily on responses by consumers. Dawar/Pillutla (2000) provide experimental evidence that recalls will generally decrease brand equity and thus cause decreases in sales. These findings also lead to a direct relationship between the value of company shares and recalls (Chu/Lin/Prather 2005) . Thus, companies face a high risk when they are involved in a recall.
Moreover, VanHeerde/DeKimpe/Helsen (2007) use a panel data set to demonstrate that advertising and price elasticities will be negatively affected by a recall. As a consequence, during a product crisis marketing must deal with a special situation in which communication routines are no longer effective or work only weakly. In particular, the company faces the risk that its messages will be ignored or perhaps even misunderstood. In such a situation, companies have to plan very carefully how to communicate the reason for their recall and how to carry out its execution.
Despite the high risks identified in previous research, research in business has not dealt with the question of how communication content can be used to minimize damage to the company's public image. The same is true for the question of how companies should design the execution of the recall to retain aggrieved customers despite the product's defects. Furthermore, our knowledge is very restricted regarding how context factors such as the degree of the product defect or the observed consequences of the faulty product impact customer behavior.
To find answers to our questions, we content-analyze actual cases of recall communications of German products distributed through retailers for which no customer identification is available. The goal of this study is to describe the behavior of companies with respect to their communication and execution of recalls, and to analyze whether consistent behavior has been established across similar recall situations. With this analysis, we hope to identify types of content in recall messages that will minimize risks and losses. Furthermore, identified situationspecific recall strategies may help companies better address their clients and the public in the case of future recalls.
The following article is organized as follows: After a discussion of the literature and a derivation of hypotheses on the communication behavior, we describe our empirical classification of the observed behavior of companies. In the next section, we detail how we relate this behavior to context factors and provide a discussion of our results. We close with a summary, followed by the implications for research and practice as well as some limitations.
Research Question and Derivation of Hypotheses

Derivation of the Research Question
Product recalls represent a special form of product crisis in which products are taken from the market because of defects or the potential to cause damage to consumers or third parties (Felcher 2003; Kersten 1992; Standop/ Grunwald 2009) . Most national laws -such as the European Guidelines for Consumer Protection or the US Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) -specify four reasons for activating product recalls: a) a substantial potential of damage for the user of a product, b) the use of material that has a toxic or detrimental effect on consumers in the short or long run, c) the risk of serious injuries or even death by improper use of the product, and d) a violation of current product safety guidelines regarding upper limits with respect to noise and environmental pollution (Chu/Lin/Prather 2005; CPSA 1972 and GPSG 2004) . As stated in the introduction, products that have been distributed through retailers such as toys, appliances or apparel, present an extremely complicated recall situation. Aside from the losses caused by reduced sales, companies face the additional costs associated with communication via mass media and possible punishment by authorities, as well as the cost of coordinating and executing the recall (Bapuji/Beamish/Laplume 2007; Beamish/Bapuji 2008; Folkes 1984; Konken 2002; Standop 1993; 1995; 2006) . Recently, the punishment has become even harsher: the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act in 2008 increased the possible fines and even specified jail time for some violations for US manufacturers (CPSC 2008) . This new approach on the part of the US administration may be underlined by the example of RC2, a manufacturer of wooden toys who imported lead-poisoned toy trains into the US and has recently been charged a civil penalty of 1.25 million US Dollars. In addition to the risk of fines, one should not forget the high risks of private lawsuits that firms in the US market face when harming customers.
In addition to these problems, any product recall represents further risks for the company: recalls negatively influence the brand's image (DeMatos/Rossi 2006; Jolly/ Mowen 1983; Mowen/Jolly/Nickell 1981; Rhee/Haunschild 2006; Siomkos/Shrivastava 1993) , its customer loyalty (Cleeren/DeKimpe/Helsen 2008) and its brand equity (Dawar/Pillutla 2000) , along with the company's stock market value (Chu/Lin/Prather 2005) . Tab. 1 gives an overview of recent studies on the effects of recalls on companies' market performance.
Product recalls will generally be communicated by the affected company through press releases or advertisements in mass media channels. This material is the cornerstone for the press and the public in dealing with a product recall. It is therefore reasonable to assume that any communication about product recalls contains all relevant information pertaining to the recall, which is why we use such announcements as our basis for analyzing how companies let the public know about product recalls.
Given the potential losses companies face from initiating a product recall, it can be assumed that they will attempt to communicate the product recall in such a way as to minimize the unwanted effects (Cezanne 1999; Haller 1998; Konken 2002) . This implies that companies will avoid a standard product recall form, and instead will have developed certain routines -depending on the type of product, who the customers are, the brand image and the defect -to communicate and execute the recall. This leads to the following research questions that, to the best of our knowledge, have yet to be answered by empirical or theoretical studies:
1. What kinds of communication content and forms of product recall execution do companies use to minimize negative effects?
2. Which context factors (situational variables) play an important role in influencing the behavior of affected companies?
Derivation of Hypotheses
National laws such as the German Appliances and Product Safety Law (GPSG), as well as various guidelines for product safety established by the European Union, do not require companies to follow specific procedures in communicating the recall of defective products; some freedom is provided for companies to design their own individual product recall and its communication. We can further assume that companies will make use of these degrees of freedom and do everything to minimize the recall's negative effects.
Some studies have shown that a company's acknowledgment of responsibility for a product defect generates a strong desire among consumers, not only for the company's punishment but for compensation for inflicted damages as well (Coombs 1998; Folkes 1984) . Thus, we hypothesize that companies will attempt to cloud the question of guilt whenever possible. Studies have also found that the communication of social responsibility and -when true -an emphasis on the voluntary nature of the product recall, in addition to immediate action by the company to address the defect, also have a positive effect (DeMatos/Rossi 2006; Jolly/Mowen 1983; Siomkos/Shrivastava 1993; Standop 1996) .
Thus, we expect that product recalls communicate social responsibility in different ways and with various magnitudes. From the results by Jolly/Mowen (1983) and Standop (2006) , it is also reasonable to hypothesize that companies vary the amount of information as well as the degree of detail they provide when communicating product recalls. This is done by either withholding or relativ-izing certain information; this practice also serves the purpose of countering possible image damage by altering the degree of transparency toward the public (Jolly/ Mowen 1983; Standop 2006; Standop/Grunwald 2009) . It is likely that companies even attempt to improve their image by designing a convenient and hassle-free product recall for their customers rather than simply conducting damage control with good communication regarding the product recall. Thus, product recall announcements will vary with respect to the transparency of communication and the degree of convenience for the affected customers.
Furthermore, the study by Mowen/Jolly/Nickell (1981) shows a negative impact on company image caused by the length of time between the discovery of a defect and the beginning of communication. This study finds that the longer the company waits to begin communication, the larger the loss of image. We can also assume that customers expect a high degree of transparency and honesty (Standop 2006) , so companies must behave accordingly. This effect implies that, although a certain degree of freedom is allowed for communicating a product recall, specific situations and the expectations of customers frequently reduce the amount of freedom a company has.
Finally, we have to be aware -as explained in chapter 2.1 -that companies are legally not completely free in how they communicate product defects in a recall. According to the German implementation of the guidelines of the European Union for consumer protection in the amended Paragraph 10 of the German Appliances and Product Safety Law (GPSG 2004), if companies, or the concerned distributor, do not communicate the defect, or do not do so in an appropriate fashion, authorities can take over communication about the product recall and inform consumers directly. According to the CPSC, the same is the case for the US market, where affected retailers or manufacturers are forced by law to at least inform the official safety commission about a product defect. In the case of non-cooperation or communication of insufficient information, the CPSC is allowed to communicate the product defect on its own. Of course, it is unlikely that the authorities will take into account the effects of full disclosure regarding a recall on the image of the company. Thus, this regulation serves as a threat, making it in a company's best interest to communicate the product defect, thereby giving the company the opportunity to design the communication with minimal damaging effects. In fact, it has been empirically shown that consumers view product recalls more positively when they are announced by the affected company than when they are communicated through public agencies (Mowen 1979; Mowen/Jolly/Nickell 1981) . Therefore, a company will design the communication of a product recall so that it follows the guidelines set forth by the public authorities but at the same time minimizes possible damage to the company's image.
Knowing how companies can design their product recall communication poses the question of how this design depends on context. Obviously, the communication may rely on the degree of hazard posed by a product defect and the probability of its occurrence. We pointed out previously that consumers tend to want to see some kind of punishment for companies recalling defective products. This desire may lead the company to employ a strategy of customer appeasement in cases of a low defect probability, an approach that tries to pacify consumers by claims about a company's social responsibility or by relativizing the defect. However, companies must not neglect their responsibility to minimize continued risks to consumers in the face of strict national laws, which will seriously punish any producer or retailer if further accidents occur. Moreover, each additional accident caused by the defective product will likely arouse increasing public interest and media pressure. So, companies will engage in a strategy that relativizes product defects and emphasizes their social responsibility only if the potential damage to consumers is small. Similarly, we can also assume that the transparency of communication will be higher when the potential damage to the consumer is higher and less transparent when risk of injury is lower.
These conclusions lead to the following hypotheses:
The lower the probability of a possible damage (hazard) caused by a product defect, the stronger a communication of social responsibility and offered transparency will take place.
H1b:
The higher the degree of a possible damage (hazard) caused by a product defect, the more transparent the communicated product recall will be.
H1c:
The higher the degree of a possible damage (hazard) caused by a product defect, the greater the emphasis will be placed on social responsibility.
Communicating social responsibility or providing more information for achieving high transparency automatically leads to longer recall messages. We explain this by the fact that companies will use more space for justification and presentation of the companies' own image. This leads to the following hypotheses:
The smaller the probability of a possible damage caused by a product defect, the more detailed and longer the product recall communication will be.
H2b:
The higher the degree of a possible damage caused by a product defect, the more detailed and longer the product recall communication will be.
The early studies by Mowen (1979) and Mowen/Jolly/ Nickell (1981) suggest that the perception of a product recall is also influenced by the customer's expense, effort and discomfort caused by returning the product. In particular, the greater the convenience of returning the product is, the smaller the final damage to the image of the defective product will be. Of course, the higher the degree of hazard caused by the product defect and the greater the probability of hazard, the more likely it is that companies will offer convenient product return proce-dures. This means that in case of low risk of damage, a company will ask customers to return the product themselves, whereas in more dangerous situations, a company will offer more convenient ways to return the product. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: The higher the probability or the degree of damage by a product defect, the higher is the degree of convenience offered for returning the product.
In general, product recalls do not affect the entire production of a product but rather smaller lots. In this case, companies communicate information that allows customers to distinguish between affected and unaffected products; this enables customers to identify dangerous products immediately, thus minimizing the risk of possible damages. At the same time, such a communication allows companies to emphasize the general safety of the product, with only specific lots being unfortunately affected. This leads to the following hypothesis:
The higher the degree of hazard or its probability, the more detailed the information communicated for consumer identification of defective products will be. Standop (1996) finds empirical support that a positive effect exists in the case of German consumers. Taking this German study, we can suppose that companies with branded products will counter possible image losses by placing a strong emphasis on social responsibility and by providing a high level of communication transparency, better identification of defect products and greater convenience of product return. Thus, we can derive the following hypotheses:
H5a: Companies with branded products communicate a higher degree of social responsibility compared to companies with non-branded products.
H5b:
Companies with branded products will make their communication more transparent than companies with non-branded products.
H5c:
Companies with branded products will communicate their product recall in a more detailed way than companies with non-branded products.
H5d:
Companies with branded products will design the product return for consumers to be more convenient than companies with non-branded products.
H5e: Companies with branded products will provide more help in identifying defective products than companies with non-branded products.
Finally, we note that the product-involvement of consumers has a substantial influence regarding their reception of a product recall (DeMatos/Rossi 2006). This study concludes that disappointment and anger about the product recall are higher for products with high involvement than for those with less involvement. The authors assume that companies will take this into account when designing their product recall. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H6a: Companies will communicate a higher degree of social responsibility for products with high involvement of consumers than for those with low involvement.
H6b: Companies will communicate in a more transparent way the product recall for products with high involvement of consumers than for those with low involvement.
H6c:
Companies design the communication of a product recall in a more detailed way for products with high involvement of consumers than for products with low involvement.
H6d:
Companies design the product return to be more convenient for consumers of products with high involvement of consumers than for low-involvement products.
H6e: Companies provide more assistance in identifying defective products with high involvement of consumers than for those with low involvement.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an empirical study consisting of two parts. The first part aims to identify different content dimensions and corresponding levels in recall messages to deliver a database for the second part. The second part of the study uses this knowledge to test the influence and the moderating effect of context and product factors on the company's choice of the dimension levels according to our hypotheses. In the first part of the study, we content-analyze the sample of product recalls for identifying dimensions and corresponding levels. In preparation for the second part of the study, we coded the sample of product recalls with respect to the identified content dimensions and levels. The second part of the study then tests the hypotheses with respect to a possible relationship between the coded recall characteristics and moderating effects.
Content Analysis of Product Recalls
The scope of the first part of the study is to identify all typical content dimensions and levels that companies use in a product recall to deliver a specific database for the second part of the study. We assume that companies choose specific communication styles and content to minimize possible damage to their image or sales losses. Based on a sample of 104 product recalls, we identify their communication dimensions and individual levels. 
Sample and Data
Product recalls are generally communicated by the affected companies through press releases and by placing advertisements in mass media. This information also serves as the basis for further press reports. We assume that these press releases and advertisements contain all the pertinent information that a company wishes to communicate to the consumer. To investigate the content of product recalls, we collected the information of all product recalls provided by the companies producing products whose consumers were not traceable between January 1, 2008, and October 1, 2009. We searched the Rapid Alert System for Non-Food (RAPEX) database (Rapex 2009 ) of the European Union, websites and databases of various consumer protection agencies of the German states (e.g., Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen), websites of several independent product testing foundations (e.g., Stiftung Warentest) and a few independent and private consumer portals such as www.produktrueckrufe.de. In total, we identified 104 product recalls coming from 51 different companies. Fig. 1 presents an overview of the product categories and the number of product recalls in the respective categories. It is clear that the sample mainly consists of toys and appliances, which coincides with the observation by Bapuji/Beamish (2008) that product recalls are most frequently found in these categories.
Methodology
To find the content dimensions and levels as well as the communication patterns and moderating context factors, we applied a content analysis method to the texts of the product recalls. This method is especially suitable for pilot studies (Mayring 2008) . Following the rules of content analysis (George 1969; Krippendorff 1980 ) -as depicted in Fig. 2 -we analyzed the product recall messages in eight steps (Mayring 2000) . We first looked for any possible dimensions of communication by inductively screening all recall messages. In a second step, we tried in an inductive way, again, to identify all possible occurrences of individual dimension levels in all recall messages. In the next step, we attempted to classify each occurrence into dimensions and then analyzed which levels per dimension are present in the various texts. After having conducted a categorization of 50 % of the data material, we revised the definition of the communication dimensions and its levels according to the suggestion by Mayring (2000; 2008) . In the end, we were able to identify six content dimensions, which are listed in Tab. 2. According to the same inductive process, we then determined the levels per dimension for a subsequent coding of the product recall messages.
Content Dimensions and Levels
As mentioned, we identified six content dimensions.
Tab. 2 provides an overview of the dimensions and their corresponding levels.
We find that companies place the strongest emphasis on social responsibility with respect to the customer. The communication of social responsibility ranges from levels such as "defect despite quality control" to very detailed descriptions of social responsibility. We also find evidence that companies vary the degree of social responsibility in their communication. Moreover, we discover that product recalls vary with respect to the degree of the level of convenience for the product return. In this dimension, we identify six levels ranging from "disposal at home" to "repair or exchange at client's home."
Product recalls often provide information on how to identify defective products in connection to the degree of hazard. Thus, we could identify a third dimension, "Help with identification." The dimension contains six levels, ranging from "mentioning the product name" to the statement that "a call center will help with individual identification."
All product recalls note the original discoverer of the product defect. Therefore, the fourth identified dimen-Social Responsibility (Soc. Respon.) 1 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control 2 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control and high safety standards 3 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control and high safety standards, stressing that customer safety comes first 4 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control and high safety standards, stressing that customer safety comes first and that no customer has been harmed yet 5 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control and high safety standards, stressing that customer safety comes first, that no customer has been harmed yet and that recall is done voluntarily 6 = Defect occurred in spite of quality control and high safety standards, stressing that customer safety comes first, that no customer has been harmed yet and that recall is done voluntarily. Relativization of the defect sion was the source of the recall. Inductively, we derived six levels for this dimension, ranging from "in-house during quality controls" to "more than ten customers." The fifth dimension is "transparency of communication." The communication can be categorized in the following levels: "problems are identified, but not sufficiently," "problem will be technically explained without discussing the outcome for the customer", and "hazard is clearly communicated without being relativized."
Following social responsibility, companies generally emphasize the fact that they are voluntarily engaging in a product recall. Despite many vague descriptions, we were able to determine three levels for the dimension "voluntariness of recall": "own decision," "because of public pressure," and "by law."
It is not surprising that product recalls provide information on the expected degree of hazard and its probability. We were able to find different levels of hazard in the product recall communication, ranging from "appliance not working" to "mortal danger."
Communication Behavior and Moderators
With the first part of the study, we show that the information on product recalls uses a common set of building blocks. We also find evidence that companies substantially vary the levels of content dimensions. In the second part of the study, we investigate whether companies more or less arbitrarily choose a certain product recall communication or whether they purposely react to context factors.
Sample and Operationalization
This second part of the study is based on the same sample as the first part. In the first part, we identified six content dimensions and their corresponding levels. Based on this operationalization of levels, five consumers between the ages of 21 and 70 with a household income of at least 1,000 Euros a month each coded all 104 product recalls. They had to decide which level of a content dimensionas specified in Tab. 2 -a company had chosen for each recall message. To avoid a single-rater bias, we aggregated the individual judgments with the help of the confidence-based weighted mean (Van Bruggen/Lilien/Kacker 2002). Confidence had to be subjectively assessed on an increasing scale from 1 to 7. Van Bruggen/Lilien/Kacker (2002) provide empirical support that this aggregation technique leads to better aggregate judgments. In addition to the coding of the content dimensions, we also asked our five experts to estimate the degree of hazard caused by the product defect and its probability on an increasing scale from 1 to 7. Although the content dimensions were categorized on an ordinal scale, we treat the variables as metric, because in using the confidence-weighted mean of the five judgments, the scale becomes quasi-metric. Of course, this assumes that the differences between neighboring scale points are the same.
In addition, we collected data on the product category (coded as dummy variables for the categories in Fig. 1) , length of text (number of words), branded product (dummy variable) and involvement (dummy variable). Our dummy variable "involvement" takes on the value "1" when the product recall comes from one of the three high-involvement categories: toys, clothing, and/or sport and leisure; otherwise, the variable is coded "0." Tab. 3 provides an overview of the means, standard deviations and, for binary variables, the number of cases with a specific characteristic for all the variables. We realize that the means for the probability and the degree of hazard are fairly high in the recall messages. In contrast, the means for the dimensions social responsibility and help with identification are fairly low, whereas the means for the two dimensions "convenience of product return" and "transparency" are also fairly high.
Methodology
To test the hypotheses, we ran two regressions. The first regression equations (1) -(3) model the type of communication depending on context factors that describe the situation the company faces. The second regression equations (4) - (5) deal with the design of the product return from the customer perspective, depending on the same context factors as just mentioned.
The communication of product recalls is characterized by the degree of the expressed social responsibility (
These three dimensions of communication are explained by the context factors "degree of hazard" (Hazard), "individual probability" (Prob), "level of involvement" (Involve) and whether a branded product (Brand) is involved. The regressions also contain the other respective content dimensions to control for simultaneity.
With respect to the design of the product return, we work with two regression equations.
Regression 4 explains the convenience of the productreturn procedure (Con-Prod-Ret), while Equation 5 explains the help with identification (HwI) of the defective product. Both choices of the company will be explained by the same context factors as above. Since 98 % of the recalls in our sample were conducted voluntarily, we do not include the VoR variable in the model. The same is true for the variable "source of recall," because 97 % of all defects were detected in-house. We estimate both structural equation models with the help of a 3 Stage Least Squares (3SLS) regression model (Green 2003; Schlichthorst 2009 ) due to the simultaneity and the contemporary correlation of the errors. To better assess the relationships of the variables in this study, Tab. 4 gives an overview of the correlations between all variables. Because the intercorrelations are fairly low, we are not concerned with multicollinearity. Tab. 5 and 6 present the results of the estimations.
Results
We tested our hypotheses by taking the respective regression coefficients of the variables in the regression equations and investigating whether a significant relationship exists. We find that Hypothesis 1 can be fully supported. In both cases, we find a negative and highly significant influence of the probability (-0.595), and a positive and highly significant influence of the degree of hazard (0.252) on social responsibility and transparency (see Tab. 5).
For Hypothesis 2, which assumes that the probability has a negative impact and the degree of hazard has a positive impact on the overall length (No.Words) of a recall message, we find only weak empirical evidence. Both parameters in Tab. 5 show the correct directions but are significant only at the 10 % level.
With respect to Hypotheses 3 and 4 (i.e., with an increasing degree of hazard and probability, companies choose more information for identification of affected products as well as a higher convenience for product return), no empirical support was found because the respective coefficients for hazard and probability are insignificant in both tables. With respect to Hypotheses 5 and 6, our results are mixed. Except for help with identification, branded products exhibit the expected positive and significant effect on social responsibility arguments (0.528), transparency (0.491) and text length (238.001), all shown in Tab. 5, and convenience of product return (0.458), which is shown in Tab. 6. However, the results are inconclusive regarding involvement. The coefficients are not significant for social responsibility arguments, transparency and text length, whereas the coefficients for convenience of return (0.645) and help with identification (-0.468) in Tab. 6 point into opposite directions. Regarding the endogenous effects between the dependent variables, we can surprisingly identify counterintuitive effects. Regarding the influence of social responsibility on transparency, we identified a negative and significant coefficient see Tab. 5) , which implies that talking about the willingness to care about customer safety results in less transparency. As expected, help with identification (1.373, see Tab. 6) is positively related to convenience of product return.
Discussion and Implications
As predicted, we were able to detect some routines for communicating a product recall. Apparently, companies tend to differentiate between communicating a product recall and organizing the product return, and alter their behavior accordingly.
Although we find empirical evidence that (as hypothesized) companies overemphasize social responsibility when the probability of hazard is low or the degree of hazard is high, we cannot find any evidence that the probability or degree of hazard has an influence on the offered comfort of a product return, or on the amount of information customers are given to ease identification of affected products. It is possible that companies want their customers to perceive a product recall as a service activity rather than as a removal of defective products forced by law.
The same can be concluded for the degree of transparency of communication. Companies tend to design the communication more transparently when the degree of hazard is high. We assume that a clear and non-relativizing communication of problems is used when companies wish to avoid further consumer damages caused by the defective product -the consequence of which being the company would receive even more negative headlines in the mass media.
It seems that high involvement and brand products are recalled in a more convenient way than non-branded or low-involvement products. This may be explained by focusing on cost effects. Most high-involvement or brand products in the sample were high-priced products for which a repair is more worthwhile than simple replacement. Furthermore, we assume that these companies use the opportunity of a product recall to underline and prove their quality claims and beliefs toward their customers by trying to avoid any inconvenience and helping customers identify affected goods quickly and easily.
At the same time, brand-producing companies seem to attempt to keep customers' trust in their brands by emphasizing social responsibility and showing a maximum amount of transparency. This strategy may be explained by the fact that most brand-producing companies try to avoid cross-effects to other products in their brand family to avoid damaging the long-term brand value. Interestingly, the findings for involvement are inconclusive. If at all, we find that companies offer a more convenient product return for high-involvement products than for low-involvement products because they fear stronger negative reactions. On the other hand, we cannot find a positive influence of involvement on the ease of identification. This rather inconsistent behavior may be caused by the fact that product recalls are very rare events, often catching companies unprepared for them. For example, companies cannot react quickly enough to install service centers or hotlines. Thus, companies can substantially improve their behavior in cases of necessary product recalls by preparing early routines or scenarios. Even if our study identifies some valuable insights as to how companies react to recall situations, more empirical investigations on the effects of communication patterns and the design of product returns on the perceptions of consumers as well as their subsequent buying behavior are necessary to provide more valuable insights for companies.
Summary
This study provides interesting results about the influence of situational factors on the behavior of companies and their communication of product recalls. Although studies in the literature focus on the effects of product recalls on brand image and sales, we analyze how companies choose their communication behavior and design their product return policy for consumers. Based on a content analysis, we find several unique dimensions of communication that companies follow, and we investigate whether the companies choose the levels of the respective communication dimensions according to situational variables such as the degree of hazard, its probability, whether the product is branded or if it represents a high-involvement product.
This study shows that companies usually follow a consistent communication behavior pattern across different situations. The degree of hazard and the probability of a product defect play an important role in expressing social responsibility and showing transparency. Furthermore, we find empirical evidence for the fact that companies producing branded and high-involvement products organize their recalls to be more convenient for their customers. A limitation of the study is that we cannot make any suggestions about optimal recall strategies because we lack information about customers' reactions to the levels of the communication dimensions in different situations. Given this fact and the low number of product recalls and in light of the difficulties faced while collecting data, future research should focus on insights from experts with the help of conjoint analyses or policy capturing approaches.
